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The Quiet-Loud-Quiet Politics of Post-Crisis Consumer 
Bankruptcy Law: the case of Ireland and the Troika 
Joseph Spooner

 
A decade after the Global Financial Crisis, many developed economies continue to strain under 
excessive household debt. This article presents evidence suggesting that the failure of policymakers to 
enact debt relief measures may lie in the superior influence of the coordinated and concentrated 
financial sector over legislative processes as compared to the diffuse and disorganised interests of 
consumer debtors. Post-crisis popular interest in technical issues of personal insolvency law created 
only a narrow space of political opportunity. Soon these questions returned to the domain of 
technocratic actors and corporate influence. The article examines this situation through an inter-
disciplinary case study of consumer bankruptcy reform in Ireland under ‘Troika’ supervision. 
Proposals initially billed as assisting over-indebted households developed into increasingly creditor-
friendly legislation in ‘quieter’ stages of technocratic decision-making. The stark implications of these 
findings highlight obstacles to resolving household debt problems and consequent risks of economic 
and political instability. 
INTRODUCTION 
Have we wasted a good crisis? A decade after the Global Financial Crisis and the beginning 
of the Great Recession, advanced economies continue to strain under the burden of 
                                                          

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wishes to thank for their particular insight, advice and encouragement Iain Ramsay, Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Susan 
Block-Lieb, Jason Kilborn, Jay Westbrook and Henrietta Zeffert. The author worked as Principal Legal 
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excessive household debt.1 Radical post-crisis activism has over time been joined by 
mainstream commentary in highlighting the negative effects of these unduly high debt 
levels.2 International institutions line up to illustrate how “debt overhang” is stifling 
economic growth, and to urge national policymakers to enact extensive household debt 
relief policies.3 In the UK, now that household debt is returning to pre-crisis levels, the Bank 
of England is forced to remind us with increasing urgency of the risks this involves.4 The 
pressure this debt burden places on households, alongside failures to “bail out” financially 
                                                          
1
 International Monetary Fund, ‘Gaining Momentum? World Economic Outlook April 2017’ (2017); Bank for 
International Settlements, ‘The Global Economy: Maturing Recoveries, Turning Financial Cycles?’ (2017). 
2
 For example, “debt refusal” campaigns featured amongst the activities of the post-crisis Occupy movement, 
while other debtor activist and civil society groups have also developed in recent years: see e.g. T. Gitlin, 
‘Occupy’s Predicament: The Moment and the Prospects for the Movement’ (2013) 64 The British Journal of 
Sociology 3; E. Hoekstra, ‘Andrew Ross on the Anti-Debt Movement’ in D. Hartmann and C. Uggen (eds), 
Owned (W W Norton & Company 2015) ch 7; J. Montgomerie and others, ‘The Politics of Indebtedness in the 
UK’ (Goldsmiths University Public Interest Report 2015) 31–36. For more mainstream conversion to this view, 
see e.g. P. Bunn and M. Rostom, ‘Household Debt and Spending in the UK’ (Bank of England Staff Working 
Paper No. 554, 2015) 554. S. Lo and K. Rogoff, ‘Secular Stagnation, Debt  Overhang and Other Rationales for 
Sluggish Growth, Six Years On’ (BIS Working Papers No. 482, 2015) 10; International Monetary Fund, ‘Fiscal 
Monitor - Debt: Use It Wisely’ (IMF 2016); Bank for International Settlements, 'Global Economy' n 1 above, 
48–50; Bank of England, ‘Financial Stability Report: June 2017’ (2017) 1–49. The scholarship of Mian and Sufi 
has been particularly influential in disseminating this realisation: see e.g. A. Mian and A. Sufi, House of Debt: 
How They (and You) Caused the Great Recession, and How We Can Prevent It from Happening Again 
(University of Chicago Press 2014).  
3
 See e.g. International Monetary Fund, ‘Dealing with Household Debt’, World Economic Outlook 2012 (IMF 
2012); International Monetary Fund, ‘Fiscal Monitor - Debt: Use It Wisely’ n 2 above. 
4
 Bank of England n 2 above; A. Brazier, ‘“Debt Strikes Back” or “The Return of the Regulator”?’ (Institute for 
Risk and Uncertainty, University of Liverpool, 24 July 2017) at 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2017/992.aspx> (last visited 6 April 2018). 
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struggling households while governments and taxpayers rescued the financial sector, have 
contributed to inequality and accompanying political unrest.5 It appears that after the crisis 
“the Great Conversation that many were expecting never took place”;6 reforms that seemed 
inevitable remain unrealised; and economies still depend on unsustainably high levels of 
household borrowing.  
This article presents evidence suggesting that policymakers’ failure to address 
household debt problems through debt relief measures may lie in the superior influence 
over the legislative process of the coordinated and concentrated financial sector, compared 
to the diffuse and disorganised group of consumer debtors.7 The article’s findings suggest 
                                                          
5
 See e.g. M. Blyth and M. Matthijs, ‘Black Swans, Lame Ducks, and the Mystery of IPE’s Missing 
Macroeconomy’ (2017) 24 Review of International Political Economy 203; I. Ramsay, Personal Insolvency in 
the 21st Century: A Comparative Analysis of the US and Europe (Hart Publishing 2017) 10; European Central 
Bank, ‘Financial Stability Review’ (ECB 2015) 148; I. Martin and C. Niedt, Foreclosed America (Stanford 
Briefs 2015) ch 4. 
6
 D. Graeber, Debt : The First 5,000 Years (Melville House 2012) 381. 
7
 By “consumer debtors”, this article refers to individuals and households in financial difficulty due to debts 
incurred for personal finance and/or small business purposes, as opposed to traders and investors who borrowed 
to fund high-end business activities. This latter category may be disproportionately represented in media 
coverage and even in bankruptcy literature, given how several high-profile businesspeople of the Celtic Tiger 
economy fell from grace and into insolvency litigation, sometimes as “bankruptcy tourists”: see e.g. Irish Bank 
Resolution Corporation Limited v Quinn (2012) [2012] NICh 1; C.Paulus, ‘Shaping the Contours of a Hybrid 
Concept - Mr Quinn’s COMI: Irish Bank Resolution Corporation v Quinn [2012] NICh 1’ (2012) 25 Insolvency 
Intelligence 75. This article examines primarily the political influence of the large minority group of financially 
troubled debtors who fell into mortgage arrears after the crisis – a group of relatively lower incomes, 
employment and familial stability, and educational attainment: Y. McCarthy, ‘Disentangling the Mortgage 
Arrears Crisis: The Role of the Labour Market, Income Volatility and Housing Equity’, Central Bank of Ireland 
Research Technical Paper 2/RT/14 (2014), 6–9. The interests of this group diverge at times from those of 
consumers more broadly, as discussed in text to notes 229-243.  
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that only a narrow space of political opportunity was created by post-crisis popular interest 
in technical issues of personal insolvency law (and financial regulation more generally), 
before these questions returned to the domain of administrative actors and corporate 
influence. While pro-debtor positions gained momentum in early ‘loud’ public policymaking 
stages following the crisis, they were supplanted by pro-creditor positions developed in the 
‘quieter’ stages of bureaucratic and technocratic decision-making. These findings are 
consistent with Olson’s classic logic of collective action, and its core idea that small groups 
with converging interests can use superior organisation to influence policymaking more 
effectively than large groups holding diverging interests.8  The results suggest that 
notwithstanding the turmoil of the Global Financial Crisis, this time was not so different,9 
and core ideas of collective action theory remain intact. This is despite recent literature that 
poses challenges to this classic position. Certain studies stress how the influence of 
concentrated interests is inversely related to the political salience of an issue,10 with 
authors using this insight to argue that the shock of financial crisis has allowed diffuse 
groups to outbid concentrated interests in the policy market.11 Another perspective, argued 
                                                          
8
 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Revised, Harvard 
University Press 1974). Existing bankruptcy literature supports an understanding of policy change founded on 
collective action theory: see e.g. D. Skeel, Debt’s Dominion : A History of Bankruptcy Law in America 
(Princeton University Press, 2001); I. Ramsay, ‘Interest Groups and the Politics of Consumer Bankruptcy 
Reform in Canada’ (2003) 53 University of Toronto LJ 379; M. Dickerson, ‘Regulating Bankruptcy: Public 
Choice, Ideology, and Beyond’ (2006) 84 Washington U L Rev 1861. 
9
 C. Reinhart and K. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Reprint edition, 
Princeton University Press 2011). 
10
 B. Farrand, ‘Lobbying and Lawmaking in the European Union: The Development of Copyright Law and the 
Rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’ (2015) 35 OJLS 487. 
11
 See e.g. L. Kastner, ‘‘Much Ado about Nothing?’ Transnational Civil Society, Consumer Protection and 
Financial Regulatory Reform’ (2014) 21 Rev Intl Political Economy 1313. 
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recently by Trumbull, is that the key to shaping consumer protection policy lies not in a 
group’s ability to organise, but rather its capacity to present its preferred policies as 
publicly legitimate (in the sense of benefitting a wider constituency or the ‘public 
interest’).12 My study suggests that such insights do not undermine the continuing 
relevance of the traditional logic of collective action, at least when supplemented by 
Culpepper’s nuance that business influence is strongest in times and spaces of ‘quiet 
politics’. 13  Final legislative provisions developed bureaucratically were much more 
favourable to creditors than the extensive debt relief promised in early public stages of the 
personal insolvency reform process.  
The article reaches these findings through a detailed case study of Irish personal 
insolvency law reform. The second section of this article shows how this study offers 
particular insight due to the unique status of personal insolvency law as an institution 
offering debt relief routinely and as of right. Few other societal institutions address more 
directly the issue of how to deal with excessive household debt levels, and the more delicate 
question of how the risks inherent in debt-dependent economies (brought into vivid 
perspective by the crisis) should be distributed across society. This section also illustrates 
why the study takes place in Ireland, a country chosen for the extent to which its experience 
exemplifies particularly strongly the past decade of financial crisis and austerity,14 and a 
                                                          
12
 Gunnar Trumbull, Strength in Numbers (Harvard University Press 2012) 22–32. Trumbull echoes earlier 
supply-side views of the regulatory market, which emphasised politicians' need to form large heterogeneous 
coalitions behind policies: James Q Wilson, ‘The Politics of Regulation’ in James Q Wilson (ed), The Politics of 
Regulation (Basic Books 1980) 361. 
13
 P.D. Culpepper, Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan (CUP 2010). 
14
 See e.g. S. Kinsella, ‘Is Ireland Really the Role Model for Austerity?’ (2012) 36 Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 223; R. Waldron and D. Redmond, ‘The Extent of the Mortgage Crisis in Ireland and Policy 
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global failure to tackle household debt problems. Ireland’s recent economic history is 
emblematic of our contemporary era of financialised capitalism,15 the “defining feature of 
[which] is the new centrality of debt.”16  
The third section proposes a method for categorising personal insolvency law 
provisions as favouring either creditor or debtor interests. Its analysis based on this method 
shows that amendments introduced in successive drafts moved the Irish legislation 
increasingly towards a pro-creditor paradigm emphasising the aim of debt collection, rather 
than one of debt relief. The final section of the article uses content analysis and process 
tracing methods17 to extend the empirical enquiry to policy documents, legislative history, 
and interest group submissions. This evidence suggests that the crisis has not caused the 
process of policymaking to overtake the lasting ideas of collective action theory. Through 
this approach, the article offers a novel methodological contribution to the study of post-
crisis politics and law-making. The detailed empirical case study of one policy measure – 
Ireland’s new personal insolvency legislation – is presented from the legal perspective of a 
consumer bankruptcy specialist. In this way the article illustrates the contribution academic 
lawyers can make to studies of policy change. It also offers a reminder that socio-legal 
studies must not neglect the processes of the making of ‘law on the books’ while tending to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Responses’ (2014) 29 Housing Studies 149; W. Roche, P. O’Connell and A. Prothero (eds), Austerity and 
Recovery in Ireland: Europe’s Poster Child and the Great Recession (OUP 2016). 
15
 See e.g. S. Ó Riain, ‘The Road to Austerity’ in Roche and others ibid, 23. 
16
 N. Fraser, ‘Contradictions of Capital and Care’ [2016] New Left Review 99, 112. 
17
 S. Talesh, ‘Institutional and Political Sources of Legislative Change: Explaining How Private Organizations 
Influence the Form and Content of Consumer Protection Legislation’ (2014) 39 Law & Social Inquiry 973, 982–
984; D. Collier, ‘Understanding Process Tracing’ (2011) 44 Political Science & Politics 823. 
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focus more readily on ‘law in action’.18 This article thus extends beyond policy change 
studies that have tended to measure broad legal developments from non-specialist 
perspectives,19 and also goes further than specialist studies that limit analysis to binary 
questions of whether political factors lead to proposed legislation being enacted or 
abandoned.20 These approaches risk focusing on only the more visible elements of 
legislation rather than assessing laws systematically, and accordingly may overstate the 
influence of weak interests such as consumers and over-indebted households.21  
In contrast, this study’s central finding is that while debtor interests appeared 
successful in adding issues to the policy agenda and making advances in early public 
legislative fora, the final detail of enacted legislation increasingly favoured creditor 
interests.22  The article concludes by illustrating the negative consequences of this position, 
arguing that if the Irish experience is replicated more widely (as it indeed appears to have 
been), then policymakers’ failure to confront excessive household debt levels may 
                                                          
18
 B. Carruthers and T. Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in England and 
the United States (Clarendon Press 1998) 45–46. 
19
 E.g. Kastner n 11 above; Trumbull n 12 above. 
20
 E.g. Farrand n 10 above. 
21
 Some studies emphasising civil society groups' success in influencing policy agendas admit that measures 
were often diluted by industry lobbyists: Kastner n 11 above, 1333. 
22
 For similar results, see e.g. A. Mian, A.Sufi and F. Trebbi, ‘Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in 
the Aftermath of Financial Crises’ (2014) 6 American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 1. 
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contribute significantly to contemporary global challenges of economic stagnation, 23 
inequality,24 and political instability.25 
PERSONAL INSOLVENCY, IRELAND, AND POST-CRISIS 
POLICYMAKING 
 
The Irish government enacted the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 with fanfare, presenting it 
as a ‘radical and comprehensive’ flagship reform and ‘a fundamental part of the 
government’s strategy to return this country to stability and economic growth.’ 26 
International organisations initially presented the law as a model for reform; 27 with IMF 
Managing Director Christine Lagarde hailing it as a ‘good example’ of measures countries 
could take to restore economic growth by addressing the problem of household debt 
overhang.28 Yet in 2014, when high debt levels left over 100,000 Irish households in 
                                                          
23
 See sources cited in n 2 above. 
24
 See e.g. Joseph Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: The Avoidable Causes and Invisible Costs of Inequality 
(Allen Lane 2012) ch 7; Susanne Soederberg, Debtfare States and the Poverty Industry: Money, Discipline and 
the Surplus Population (Routledge 2014). 
25
 See sources cited in n 5 above. 
26
 Department of Justice and Equality, ‘Personal Insolvency Bill 2012 Passed by Houses of Oireachtas’ (19 
December 2012) <http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR12000365>  (last visited 6 April 2018). 
27
 See e.g. European Investment Bank, ‘Unlocking Lending in Europe’ (23 October 2014) 36–38; B. Mesnard 
and others, ‘Non-Performing Loans in the Banking Union: Stocktaking and Challenges’ (PE 574.400, 18 March 
2016) 8. Troika-supervised personal insolvency reforms in Cyprus were modelled on the Irish law: see 
International Monetary Fund, Cyprus: Eighth Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended 
Fund Facility (Country Report No 15/271, 25 September 2015) 46. 
28
 C. Lagarde, ‘IMF Videos - Jobs and Growth: Supporting the European Recovery’ (28 January 2014) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid=3117816385001> (last visited 6 April 2018). 
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residential mortgage arrears, the law’s first year of operation produced fewer than 1000 
cases.29 In a review of its work alongside the European Commission and European Central 
Bank as part of the ‘Troika’, the IMF criticised the reforms both for their delayed enactment 
and substantive content, which did not build on international best practices.30 The European 
Commission condemned a law ‘characterised by high costs and relatively complex 
processes’, which ‘did not succeed in reducing household arrears’.31 Similar criticisms 
arrived from the different perspective of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which saw human rights standards as necessitating more substantial 
mortgage debt relief measures than those offered by Irish legislators.32 Perhaps the most 
significant condemnation came from the Irish government itself, who accepted the law’s 
failure to meet expectations (the government had predicted over 20,000 annual cases) and 
responded with multiple legislative amendments. It explained changes enacted in 2015 as 
being necessary to ‘ensure a better balance between the interests of secured lenders and 
the interests of those facing unsustainable mortgages’,33 acknowledging the original 
legislation’s inability to weigh optimally creditor and debtor interests. This paper starts 
from this position, accepting that the legislation was skewed unduly towards creditor 
interests. It then aims to explain, by focusing on the law’s political development, how this 
                                                          
29
 See Figure 2 below.  
30
 International Monetary Fund, ‘Ireland: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 Extended 
Arrangement’ (IMF Country Report No. 15/20, 2015) 25. 
31
 European Commission, ‘Ex Post Evaluation of the Economic Adjustment Programme - Ireland, 2010-2013’ 
(Institutional Paper 4, 2015) 57. 
32
 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding Observations on the 3rd Periodic 
Report of Ireland’ (E/C.12/IRL/CO/3, 2015) 8. 
33
 Seanad Éireann Debate vol 241 No. 9 cols 687-8, 16 July 2015 (Minister Aodhán Ó Ríordáin T.D.). 
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result arose from legislative proposals initially described as aiming to offer relief to 
financially troubled households.34 
This study’s relevance extends far beyond Ireland and highlights a wider failure of 
policymakers in advanced economies to address household debt problems. Commentators 
in several jurisdictions criticise policy responses to the Global Financial Crisis and Great 
Recession for prioritising the protection of financial institutions over assisting indebted 
households. US authors note how legislation responding to mortgage debt crisis has ‘inured 
to the benefit of banks and financial institutions’,35 with policymakers’ abandonment of 
proposals to introduce mortgage principal reduction in bankruptcy (‘cram-down’) 
representing ‘a stark choice of supporting Wall Street [over] Main Street interests’.36 
Political commentators have gone so far as to link this choice, criticised as President 
Obama’s ‘great betrayal’ of voters,37 to political instability and President Trump’s election.38 
                                                          
34
 See text to notes 179-182 below.  
35
 L. Coco, ‘Foaming the Runway for Homeowners: U.S. Bankruptcy Courts Preserving Homeownership in the 
Wake of the Affordable Modification Program’ (2015) 23 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 421, 421. 
36
 A. Levitin, ‘Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, The’ 
(2013) 127 Harv L Rev 1991, 2007; A. Mian and A. Sufi n 2 above, 122, 133–134; A. Mian, A. Sufi and F. 
Trebbi, ‘The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis’ (2010) 100 American Econ Rev 1967. 
37
 J. Taub, Other People’s Houses (Yale University Press 2014) 247–266. 
38
 D. Dayen, ‘Obama Failed to Mitigate America’s Foreclosure Crisis’ [2016] The Atlantic (4 December 2016) 
<https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/obamas-failure-to-mitigate-americas-foreclosure-
crisis/510485/>  (last visited 6 April 2018); G. Younge, ‘How Barack Obama Paved the Way for Donald 
Trump’ The Guardian (16 January 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/16/how-
barack-obama-paved-way-donald-trump-racism> (last visited 6 April 2018). See also Blyth and Matthijs’ 
argument that the populism of Trump, Brexit and elsewhere can be understood as “a political reaction to the 
reversal of power between creditors and debtors” represented in decades of policies producing "a creditors' 
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Personal insolvency law reforms in European jurisdictions have similarly fallen short,39 in a 
context of policymakers’ general eagerness to protect banking sectors and appease 
international financial markets (particularly in fiscally imbalanced states).40 The Irish case 
offers significant insight into how policy responses tended to prioritise financial sector 
interests over those of financially troubled households. It is an exemplar case of financial 
crisis, and the influence of the Troika’s international organisations ensures its relevance to 
wider perspectives on these global problems. Any inadequacies of the legislation reflect 
failings not just of domestic policymakers but of the crisis management abilities of these 
international organisations. These institutions’ shaping of domestic personal insolvency 
reforms may be particularly insightful as the IMF now exhorts national policymakers to 
enact debt reduction policies,41 and the European Commission takes first steps towards 
proposing the harmonisation of substantive national insolvency laws.42 The Irish case also 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
paradise" of high household debt, ultra-low inflation and a reduced share of growth for labour: Blyth and 
Matthijs n 5 above, 215, 219.  
39
 See e.g. M. Mouzouraki, ‘(Failure to Set up an Efficient) Out-of-Court System to Deal with Debtors in 
Financial Distress in Greece’ and G. Comparato, ‘The Italian Law against Over-Indebtedness: Fresh Start, Debt 
Advice and Financial Education’ in F. Ferretti (ed), Comparative Perspectives of Consumer Over-Indebtedness 
(Eleven International Publishing 2016). 
40
 W. Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (Verso Books 2014); M. Sandbu, 
Europe’s Orphan: The Future of the Euro and the Politics of Debt (Princeton University Press 2015); I. 
Ramsay, ‘Two Cheers for Europe: Austerity, Mortgage Foreclosures and Personal Insolvency Policy in the EU’ 
in H. Micklitz and I. Domurath (eds), Consumer Debt and Social Exclusion (Routledge 2015). 
41
 International Monetary Fund, ‘Debt: Use It Wisely’ n 2 above. See also earlier IMF institutional and staff 
reports:  International Monetary Fund, ‘Dealing with Household Debt’ n 3 above; J. Andritzky, ‘Resolving 
Residential Mortgage Distress: Time to Modify?’ (IMF Working Paper WP/14/226, 2014). 
42
 The European Commission initially suggested that legislation should extend to consumer insolvency, but its 
latest Proposal limits itself to corporate and “entrepreneur” debtors, merely “inviting” Member States to apply 
debt discharge provisions to consumers: European Commission, ‘Initiative on Insolvency: Inception Impact 
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offers insight to wider debates regarding the appropriate influence of the Troika over 
domestic policymaking,43  and the extent to which decisions of politically insulated 
technocratic actors can outweigh democratic demands.44  
Similarly, legislation in this area offers a unique crucible for testing the extent to 
which policies advance either household or financial sector interests. Personal insolvency 
law is usually conceptualised as representing a balance between two primary objectives: 
debt collection and the maximisation of creditor returns on one hand, and on the other the 
provision of debt relief to over-indebted individuals under the ‘fresh start’ policy.45 
Tensions arise due to the difficulty of reconciling these aims, so that meaningful policy 
decisions often cannot avoid prioritising one over the other. By observing choices in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Assessment’ (2016/JUST/025, 2016) 5; European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Preventive Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and Measures to 
Increase the Efficiency of Restructuring, Insolvency and Discharge Procedures and Amending Directive 
2012/30/EU’, 2016/0359 (COD) COM(2016) 723 final 14. The European Central Bank is also directing 
Member States to reform substantive insolvency laws in its focus on addressing problems of non-performing 
loans (NPLs) among European banks: European Central Bank, ‘Stocktake of National Supervisory Practices and 
Legal Frameworks Related to NPLs’ (ECB 2016). 
43
 See e.g. C. Kilpatrick, ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic Legal 
Values in Europe’s Bailouts’ (2015) 35 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 325; European Parliament Committee 
on Economic and Monetary Affairs, ‘Report on the Enquiry on the Role and Operations of the Troika (ECB, 
Commission and IMF) with Regard to the Euro Area Programme Countries’ (28 February 2014). 
44
 Levitin n 36 above, 1994; Streeck n 40 above. 
45
 See e.g. C. Hallinan, ‘The Fresh Start Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an 
Interpretive Theory’ (1986) 21 U Rich L Rev 49, 50; E. Warren, ‘Principled Approach to Consumer 
Bankruptcy, A’ (1997) 71 Am Bankr LJ 483, 483; P. Shuchman, ‘An Attempt at a ‘Philosophy of Bankruptcy’’ 
(1973) 21 UCLA L Rev 403, 450; I. Fletcher, ‘Bankruptcy Law Reform: The Interim Report of the Cork 
Committee, and the Department of Trade Green Paper’ (1981) 44 MLR 77, 81.  
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personal insolvency reform, we can therefore see policymakers preferring either creditor or 
debtor interests. Personal insolvency policymaking also may reveal glimpses of actors’ 
wider worldviews. Given that the justifications for bankruptcy prioritising its debt 
collection aim derive from the contractarian ‘creditors’ bargain’ theory,46 the extent of one’s 
adherence to this view offers a test of one’s faith in the efficiency of free markets. In 
contrast, those believing that the ‘predominant purpose - if not the sole purpose’ of 
bankruptcy law is to discharge debtors’ liabilities and offer them a ‘fresh start’,47 see 
consumer credit markets as prone to failure and demanding regulatory intervention. Those 
emphasising efficiency over equity will require bankruptcy to enforce contracts and 
replicate market allocations ‘with as few dislocations as possible’. 48  Contrarily, those 
committed to alleviating inequality condemn pro-creditor bankruptcy laws as contributing 
to distributive injustice and related macroeconomic harm.49  Policymakers prioritising the 
maximisation of creditor returns are likely to adhere to the dominant ‘bank lending’ 
understanding of the financial crisis and recession, 50 seeing these events as caused by a 
banking crisis and necessitating policy responses that protect banks and their credit 
intermediation function. In contrast, those viewing the provision of a fresh start to over-
indebted households as being necessary for economic growth are likely to understand the 
                                                          
46
 T. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University Press 1986). 
47
 J. Kilborn, ‘Mercy, Rehabilitation, and Quid Pro Quo: A Radical Reassessment of Individual Bankruptcy’ 
(2003) 64 Ohio St LJ 855, 866. 
48
 Jackson n 46 above, 253. 
49
 Stiglitz n 24 above, ch 7; Mian and Sufi n 2 above, 135–151. 
50
 Mian and Sufi n 2 above, 10–11. 
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recession as a crisis of collapsing consumption among debt-laden households. 51  The study 
of bankruptcy policy thus offers perspective on a range of political currents post-crisis.  
AN OUTLINE OF IRISH PERSONAL INSOLVENCY LAW REFORM 
 
Inadequacy of Ireland’s pre-crisis debt laws 
 
This paper documents, and seeks to explain, how a post-crisis policy measure originally 
presented as protective of over-indebted households increasingly became relatively more 
favourable to financial institution interests throughout its successive drafts. This paper 
does not claim that the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 enshrined an objectively ‘creditor 
friendly’ bankruptcy law. It is sceptical of such absolute characterisations of laws as either 
creditor or debtor friendly,52 and acknowledges that Ireland’s law may be considered less 
creditor friendly than those of comparable jurisdictions.53 Further, the Act undoubtedly 
improves the legal position of over-indebted households, who previously were offered no 
debt relief. When a household debt crisis struck in 2008, Ireland effectively lacked 
consumer insolvency law.54 The bankruptcy law on the books (the Bankruptcy Act 1988) 
                                                          
51
 International Monetary Fund, ‘Dealing with Household Debt’, n 3 above; Mian and Sufi n 2 above; Adair 
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was almost unused, with 8, 15, 29, 33 and 35 bankruptcies in the respective crisis years 
from 2008 to 2012. In 2008 many more debtors (276) were imprisoned under severe 
legislation enacted in the post-Civil War-era,55 which applied until judicially expunged on 
human rights grounds in 2009.56 Few debtors who could afford to negotiate the unwieldy 
procedure wished to petition to enter what was effectively a lifelong bankruptcy, which was 
reduced to a 12-year process only in 2011, on the introduction of the automatic discharge 
principle.57 For tens of thousands of households in mortgage arrears by late 2008, options 
were limited to negotiating extra-legal settlements with creditors. Often the State-funded 
Money Advice and Budgeting Service (MABS) assisted,58 renegotiating and/or managing 
debts on behalf of 16,600 debtors in 2008.59 The Central Bank of Ireland also instituted a 
temporary repossession moratorium and a mortgage debt renegotiation scheme in 2009.60 
This may have contributed to the successful maintenance of home repossessions at 
relatively low levels despite severe mortgage arrears levels, though the unwillingness of 
banks to crystallise losses of a plummeting housing market may also explain their 
reluctance to seize homes. 61 Despite the restructuring of almost 115,000 mortgages by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ireland, Consultation Paper on Personal Debt Management and Debt Enforcement (LRC CP 56-2009, 2009) 
para 3.143 et seq. 
55
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland n 54 above, 151–157. 
56
 See McCann v Judge of Monaghan District Court and Others, [2009] IEHC 276; J. Spooner, 'Enforcement of 
Court Orders (Amendment) Act 2009, in R. Clark (ed.), Irish Current Law Statutes Annotated 2009 (Thomson 
Reuters 2010). 
57
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59
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61
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end of 2014 (approximately 15 per cent of all residential mortgages), this scheme left banks 
free to determine the terms of restructures.62 Commentators have criticised the process as 
being unduly slow,63 producing restructures of dubious sustainability,64 and addressing 
readily solved cases while ignoring more difficult situations.65  
Ireland’s new law: key features 
Irish law was thus ill equipped for a household debt crisis. Successive governments 
identified the need to reform personal insolvency law, and the resultant 2012 Act amends 
the outdated bankruptcy procedure while also establishing three new procedures.66 Under 
the Debt Settlement Arrangement (DSA) procedure, a debtor who satisfies a qualified 
insolvency test and other conditions may, via a statutorily qualified personal insolvency 
practitioner, negotiate a repayment arrangement with her unsecured creditors under court 
protection.67 If 65 per cent in value of creditors agree to the debtor’s proposal, it comes into 
effect as a Debt Settlement Arrangement on court approval.68 The parties, subject to certain 
statutory mandatory terms, decide repayment conditions.69 This mechanism effectively 
                                                          
62
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63
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provides ‘hold-out’ creditors with a ‘veto’ over debtor proposals,70 with about 20 per cent of 
cases rejected at the creditor voting phase.71 Repayment levels must afford the debtor a 
reasonable standard of living (taking into account statutory guidelines issued by newly 
created agency the Insolvency Service of Ireland (ISI)). Repayment plans can last for no 
longer than six years, 72 at the end of which the debtor’s remaining obligations are 
discharged (with an average write-down of 87 per cent of a debtor’s unsecured debt in 
accepted cases).73 Priority creditors and secured creditors are protected from discharge, 
however. At least procedural, if not substantive, protection is afforded to the debtor’s home 
through requirements that practitioners prepare arrangements on such terms as will not 
require debtors to leave residences, insofar as reasonably practicable.74 The debtor must 
cooperate and act in good faith throughout, on sanction of criminal penalty or termination 
of the arrangement.75  
The Personal Insolvency Arrangement (PIA) procedure is largely similar, subject to 
the following differences. Access conditions are more onerous (for example, debtors 
applying must show six months’ cooperation with creditors in respect of rescheduled 
                                                          
70
 See O’Callaghan (A Bankrupt) [2015] IEHC 185 at [13] (Costello J). 
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mortgage loans). 76 The PIA procedure allows for both secured and unsecured debt to be 
renegotiated, but only where the 65 per cent creditor approval includes support of over half 
of both unsecured creditors and secured creditors.77 These criteria are satisfied in 
approximately only half of cases that proceed past the initial application stage.78 While all 
non-excluded unsecured debts are discharged on completion of a repayment plan enduring 
for a maximum of seven years, secured debts are only discharged to the extent specified in 
the arrangement.79 The legislation merely sets out various options as to how creditors might 
agree to treat mortgage debt. 80 This procedure has resulted in an average write-down of 82 
per cent of debtors’ unsecured debt in accepted cases, and 17 per cent of secured debt.81 
The legislation protects strongly the rights of any secured creditor who consents to 
participate in a PIA, however. Most significantly, a ‘claw-back’ provision entitles a secured 
creditor whose mortgage debt is reduced in a PIA to recover the principal reduction if the 
debtor’s home is sold at a higher value any time within a period of 20 years.82 Therefore 
even on PIA completion, debtors might not obtain a true ‘fresh start’. 
The third new procedure introduced is the means-tested ‘no income, no assets’ Debt 
Relief Notice (DRN). This offers qualifying debtors a debt discharge (after a three-year 
waiting period83) without surrender of income and assets. Access is controlled by a qualified 
insolvency test and certain debtor conduct requirements, as well as income, asset and debt 
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limits.84 The procedure is largely administrative (albeit subject to court oversight), with the 
debtor applying to the ISI, via an approved intermediary (a debt counsellor). Duties of good 
faith and cooperation apply to debtors throughout, with sanctions of postponement or 
denial of discharge.85 One idiosyncratic aspect is that the Irish legislation introduces a debt 
collection function into a procedure of a type considered in other jurisdictions to serve a 
sole aim of ‘unadulterated debt relief’.86 Thus the DRN requires a debtor to make payments 
to creditors if she receives property or increased income during the three year period.87 
Finally, the legislation amended the bankruptcy procedure, reducing the standard 
waiting period for automatic discharge from twelve to three years.88 It also increased 
property exemption levels (including providing new protection of debtors’ pensions).89 
Longstanding and potentially outdated doctrines of ‘fraudulent’ preferences and ‘acts of 
bankruptcy’ persist,90 however, alongside many debtor restrictions and sanctions of 
questionable compatibility with human rights standards.91 Provisions introduced in 2012 
(reformed in 2015) provided for debtors to make repayments to creditors for up to five 
years after discharge.92 The length of the pre-bankruptcy period during which debtors’ 
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transactions may be investigated for prohibited undervalued or preferential dealing was 
extended from one year to three.93 Finally, the legislation failed to remedy problems of 
accessing bankruptcy procedures under prior law,94 and in fact created new obstacles. The 
2012 Act emphasises the negotiation of consensual repayment arrangements and avoidance 
of bankruptcy, rather than embracing a more liberal bankruptcy debt discharge.95 Before 
applying for bankruptcy, debtors must engage a Personal Insolvency Practitioner to affirm 
to the court that the debtor has made ‘reasonable efforts’ to negotiate a rescheduling 
agreement with creditors by applying for a DSA or PIA, if viable.96  
 
Inefficacy and imbalance of the new law 
 
This last feature marks a chief criticism of the 2012 legislation and a perennial risk in 
consumer bankruptcy law: that the prioritisation of consensual renegotiation over 
legislatively defined outcomes will lead creditors to use their strong bargaining position to 
advance their interests over public policy aims. 97 A purely voluntary process, as evident 
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from experiences in other jurisdictions,98 is unlikely to persuade creditors to write down 
loans to market value and to offer substantial debt forgiveness.99 While the bankruptcy 
procedure provides comparatively generous debt relief, this hides behind onerous access 
conditions, conduct obligations and procedural complexity. These factors directly impede 
access but also raise administrative and professional representation costs, 100 risking 
indirect exclusion of poorly-resourced debtors.101 Consequently, both the ability and 
incentives of debtors to enter all procedures are reduced, contributing to the legislation’s 
low take-up rate.102 In the first four full years of operation combined, there were fewer than 
2,000 bankruptcies, just over 1,000 DRNs, fewerless than 700 DSAs, and just over 2,000 
PIAs.103 These figures are remarkably small compared to, say, neighbouring England and 
Wales, particularly given that over 95,000 Irish households were in mortgage loan arrears 
of over 90 days when the law came into effect (Figures 1, 2). The use of the new procedures 
has been significantly below government expectations, which had predicted annual figures 
of 3,000-4,000 bankruptcies, 3,000-4,000 DRNs and approximately 15,000 DSA/PIA 
                                                          
98
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applications (Figure 2). 104 Despite few applications, attrition rates seem high, with 4,001 
PIA applications in 2017 and only 733 approved arrangements.105  
 
Figure 1: Personal Insolvencies per 10,000 Population, Ireland v England and Wales. Source: Insolvency 
Service; Insolvency Service of Ireland 
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105
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Figure 2: The Personal Insolvency Act 2012 procedures have been underused compared to government 
predictions and to levels of household mortgage arrears. Source: Central Bank of Ireland, Insolvency Service of 
Ireland, Government of Ireland.  
 
The government accepted these criticisms to some degree in amending the 2012 
legislation. The complexity of the Act generated ‘operational difficulties’106 and clarifying 
legislation was passed within a year of its enactment, effecting over 70 ‘technical drafting 
amendments’.107 A further amendment responded to concerns that the €20,000 cap on 
debts of DRN applicants was ‘overly stringent and excluded many indebted persons from 
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returning to solvency.’108 The limit was raised to €35,000,109 but this reform has not resulted 
in increased use of the procedure.110 In an ideological departure from the initial ‘user pay’ 
model of market provision of public services,111 cost reduction measures included state 
agencies waiving administration fees payable by debtors and funding free access to 
personal insolvency practitioners.112 Most visibly, bankruptcy’s waiting period for discharge 
was reduced to just one year, with the maximum duration of debtor repayments shortened 
to three years.113 Significantly, the government admitted problems created by the ‘veto’ of 
creditors over proposed arrangements, at least for mortgage debt. It introduced a form of 
‘cram-down’ mechanism whereby courts are empowered, in limited circumstances, to 
review and overturn creditors’ rejection of a debtor’s PIA proposal.114 The government 
considered this reform necessary to produce ‘fair and sustainable debt restructuring’, better 
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balancing the interests of creditors and debtors and allowing borrowers to ‘work their way 
out of debt with a view to keeping their homes’.115 This measure coincides with a sharp 
increase in PIA applications, but has had little impact on the number of concluded 
arrangements.116 
These post-2012 reforms all reflect debtor-friendly amendments, recognising that 
the original Act was overly weighted towards the interests of creditors, and that this skew 
contributed to the law’s inefficacy. Comparative consumer bankruptcy observers may be 
frustrated by the predictability of these problems, based on experiences of reform in other 
jurisdictions.117 Irish legislators added to a recognisable trend of policymakers initially 
adopting laws insufficiently supportive of debt relief objectives, before being forced into 
subsequent amendments offering more extensive relief.118 While others have noted that 
policymakers are frequently unresponsive to bankruptcy research’s findings,119 questions 
arise as to why these predictable problems were designed into the 2012 law, and as to why 
successive preliminary drafts of the law became increasingly creditor friendly. This is 
particularly puzzling as a technical policy case for expansive debt relief laws builds ever 
more widely. In the past decade of financial crisis and sluggish global recovery, academic 
research and policy papers of organisations such as the IMF have increasingly recognised 
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the ‘debt overhang’ problem, under which excessive household debt levels constrain 
consumption and so economic growth. 120 The ‘harshness of debt’ shifts losses of economic 
downturn onto society’s borrowers (as employment, incomes and house prices fall), while 
creditors are protected in retaining claims both to security and full loan repayment.121 Since 
society’s debtors have a higher marginal propensity to consume than its creditors, this 
unequal distribution of the costs of crisis leads to significant falls in aggregate demand and 
consequent economic downturn. A vicious cycle can develop, in which slow economic 
growth makes household deleveraging difficult, while debt overhang impedes growth.122 
Measures such as household debt relief laws can then offer a means of breaking this cycle, 
restoring debtors’ ability to contribute to growth through increased consumption.123 Irish 
crisis conditions presented a particularly strong case for using debt relief to address debt 
overhang.124 Following the Troika programme the IMF judged that debt burdens continued 
to restrict household spending, suggesting that measures such as the 2012 Act were 
inadequate. 125 This all raises questions as to why the 2012 Act did not offer more extensive 
household debt relief.  
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THE PRO-CREDITOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSONAL INSOLVENCY 
ACT 2012 
 
Categorising personal insolvency legislative provisions as more/less favourable 
to creditor/debtor interests  
 
This section shows how a law deemed overly creditor friendly resulted from the 
introduction of a series of pro-creditor amendments to an initial legislative proposal 
presented as assisting over-indebted households. This paper uses a consumer bankruptcy 
specialist’s knowledge of insolvency legislation and literature to carry out detailed 
interpretation necessary to identify differences in subsequent legislative drafts. It then 
categorises amendments in accordance with the extent to which they reflect more closely 
debt collection (creditor wealth maximisation) or debt relief (fresh start) paradigms rooted 
in theoretical understandings of personal insolvency law. The study used what can broadly 
be considered as content analysis and process tracing methods.126 It involved close 
examination and coding of three successive drafts of the Irish legislation (and one 
parliamentary report). It began by examining each provision of the drafts and ascertaining 
at which stage it was inserted into the legislative text. It also analysed legislative history and 
policy documents to identify justifications advanced in support of each amendment. The 
next step was a qualitative relative coding process for comparing successive drafts of the 
legislation. This grouped individual provisions of each draft into categories based on eleven 
key features identified in literature as forming fundamental elements of a consumer 
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bankruptcy law.127  Each category of provisions was then coded as representing either a 
‘Debt Collection’ or ‘Debt Relief’ change, where the draft in question moved this category of 
provisions towards the respective debt collection/creditor wealth maximisation or debt 
relief/fresh start paradigms.128 These steps were then replicated in respect of each of the 
four procedures introduced or reformed by the 2012 Act (DRN, DSA, PIA and bankruptcy), 
and in respect of each subsequent legislative draft.  
The method is one of qualitative analysis and relative coding of legislative provisions, 
differing from quantitative studies that seek to assign numerical values to legislative 
provisions using an absolute scale.129 The present method confines itself to indicating 
whether a draft is closer to debt collection or debt relief paradigms than its previous 
iteration, avoiding blunt designations of a statute as absolutely ‘creditor friendly’ or ‘debtor 
friendly’.130  This method bypasses difficulties of weighting legal features of varying 
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importance and complexity,131 and comparing legal rules across jurisdictions.132 While ‘it is 
inevitable that opinions may differ over the appropriate coding of particular provisions’,133 
the study’s method, and particularly its reliance on expert legal interpretation, facilitates 
more systematic analysis of policy change than non-specialist analyses that depend on 
broader indicators such as whether or not legislation has been enacted.134 
Provisional results: successive drafts towards an increasingly pro-creditor 
law 
 
The emerging picture is of legislation that moved increasingly towards a debt collection 
paradigm throughout its evolution, apart from the isolated event of a parliamentary 
committee report proposing amendments that would have directed the law in a debt relief 
direction (Tables 2-5, Appendix). The first government draft (Draft General Scheme of 
Personal Insolvency Bill, hereinafter ‘Draft 1’), when compared to the proposed legislation 
of non-political public agency the Law Reform Commission (‘LRC’), involved moves towards 
a debt collection paradigm across all four procedures and in up to ten of eleven categories 
(Table 2).135 In contrast, parliamentary committee recommendations following public 
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hearings moved towards a ‘debt relief’ paradigm in seven of eleven categories, compared to 
Draft 1 (Table 3). The introduction of the Personal Insolvency Bill to parliament evidenced 
an opposite trend, as it ignored the committee’s recommendations and represented a shift 
even further towards the debt collection paradigm than Draft 1. Provisions were coded as 
moving in this direction in eight categories (Table 4). These changes were primarily limited 
to the DRN and DSA procedures, as the PIA procedure as established in the first government 
draft (the LRC not having proposed such a procedure specialised to address mortgage debt) 
already leaned more heavily towards a debt collection paradigm than comparable original 
DSA provisions. The Bill’s approach to the bankruptcy procedure remained more closely 
aligned with the debt relief paradigm, with two categories of amendments moving in this 
direction. The Bill represented the final round of major developments to the legislation, and 
the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 passed by parliament largely remained unchanged from 
the Bill. Two categories of the final Act moved towards the debt collection paradigm, with 
two moving in the opposite direction in respect of bankruptcy, and one in respect of the 
other procedures (Table 5). 
QUIET-LOUD-QUIET POLITICS OF HOUSEHOLD DEBT IN A TIME 
OF CRISIS 
 
The core concern of this paper is to consider explanations for this veering of the 2012 law 
towards a debt collection paradigm throughout its development, so as to shed light on 
wider policy failures in addressing household debt problems in advanced economies. While 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
politics, since it consults with stakeholders and has its own institutional legitimacy interest in seeing 
recommendations implemented.  
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acknowledging the important role that ideas play in policy change,136 this section applies 
collective action theory to assess the influence of interests in shaping the law.137 Personal 
insolvency legislation often represents ‘a compromise between organised creditor groups 
and the countervailing pressures of populism and other pro-debtor movements.’138 This 
analysis assesses the extent to which these factors explain the development of the 2012 Act 
and its apparent prioritisation of financial sector interests over those of troubled 
households. It considers particularly whether this case supports arguments that traditional 
understandings of collective action theory were ruptured by post-crisis politics, as the 
heightened salience of financial regulation and creditor-debtor laws created space for 
popular influence over policymaking. This section maps the coding of legislative drafts 
against a content analysis of domestic policy documents, parliamentary debates, interest 
group submissions, and reviews of Ireland’s financial assistance programme by the ‘Troika’ 
of the ECB, European Commission and IMF. The findings are consistent with traditional 
collective action theory, read with the ‘Quiet Politics’ thesis of policy change.139 This thesis 
argues that popular and diffuse interests are advanced furthest in public fora, while less 
visible bureaucratic and technocratic stages produce outcomes more favourable to 
concentrated business interests.   
Under classic collective action logic, the most successful policy influencers in 
competitions between interest groups are small concentrated groups of politically 
organised actors with harmonious, cohesive and intense interests.140 The financial sector 
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137
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fits this description as clearly as consumer or debtor groups do not,141 and consumer 
bankruptcy literature often highlights creditors’ influence over legislative development.142 
Such sway is well recognised in political discourse, with one Irish politician for example 
criticising the ‘obvious and regrettable’ influence of the Irish banking industry over the 
draft personal insolvency legislation.143 Success of various interest groups in winning 
favourable legislation depends, however, on ‘environmental conditions’. These include the 
technical complexity of the policy in question, its salience, the institutional context of 
policymaking (for example whether actors are transnational or domestic), and the stage (or 
forum) of the policymaking process.144 Discussion below considers how factors of salience 
and technical complexity may explain developments at various stages of the process of 
reforming household debt laws during the Irish economic crisis. This section first outlines 
the institutional context, however.  
 
Institutional context: democratic and technocratic policymaking  
 
The legislation was introduced by the Irish government and enacted by the Irish legislative 
arm, the Oireachtas, which consists of an elected figurehead President, and a parliament of a 
wholly elected lower chamber (Dáil Éireann) and partially elected upper chamber (Seanad 
Éireann). The domestic policymakers were therefore politicians, who literature assumes to 
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hold primary aims of seeking re-election and enacting their desired policies.145 As well as 
requiring politicians to follow popular opinion and win approval of the ‘median voter’,146 
these aims also necessitate the support of interest groups and party activists.147 
Concentrated business, and particularly financial, organisations hold particular influence 
due to governments’ reliance on corporate tax revenues, economic expertise, and funding of 
political and public relations campaigns. 148 These factors were heightened in the Irish 
context of a financialised economy,149 which became subsumed by the European banking 
crisis and accompanying ‘problems for politicians’ ability to distinguish the interests of 
banks from those of the state, let alone the population’.150  Politicians must adopt various 
strategies to balance popular opinion, their sense of ‘good public policy’ and preferences of 
influential interest groups and activists. Through ‘strategic shirking’, they may use tools 
such as legislative rules and procedures to obscure unappealing policy attributes from 
voters who have difficulty monitoring such action, while reassuring closer observers (party 
colleagues, attentive interest groups) that their preferences are secure.151 Alternatively, 
politicians may seek to change public opinion in order to win support for policy.152  
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A further constraint on politicians’ actions arises from a state’s financing needs. In 
the modern ‘debt state’, politicians may be subject not just to their political constituency, 
but also to a second ‘constituency’ of creditors who finance government operations.153 
Governments of course must maintain ongoing support of interest groups and activists, and 
win over public opinion in periodic elections. Their policies must also, however, earn 
confidence of closely monitoring international investors, to encourage favourable trading 
activity in continual sovereign bond auctions.154 Governments thus might be led to favour 
sovereign debt service over public expenditure and the protection of bank balance sheets 
over those of households. In the context of banking crises, governments also may adopt 
bank-friendly policies as a sales pitch to investors who represent potential purchasers of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) of bailed out banks,155 or of shares of nationalised banks 
which governments intend to return to private ownership. Acknowledgement of state 
finances (and the intertwined issue of banking solvency) highlights the role of technocratic, 
rather than democratic, policymakers, particularly during (sovereign debt) crises. Such 
circumstances bring de facto transfers of power to technical institutions such as 
independent central banks, due to technical complexity, polarised political conflict and 
ultimately ‘political paralysis’.156 Thus the Central Bank of Ireland necessarily played a key 
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role in Ireland’s crisis management.157 When a state’s actions lose the favour of their 
financial constituency, consequences can include further political constraints in the form of 
funding arrangements agreed with international organisations.158 Domestic policymakers’ 
freedom was limited by Ireland’s entry into financial assistance programmes with the 
European Commission and IMF, with funding conditional on pursuit of certain policies 
under monitoring by the ‘Troika’.159  
These institutions presented themselves as serving technical aims of stabilising 
Ireland’s banking sector and public finances.160 The Troika’s actions cannot be divorced 
from their own complex (sometimes conflicting) interests and political influences, 
however.161 While the IMF remained responsible to the country seeking financial assistance, 
the European Commission negotiated on behalf of the Eurogroup. The Commission’s 
decisions involved wider concerns such as Eurozone contagion, and represented a 
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compromise of various political pressures exerted on national governments. 162  The IMF’s 
Independent Evaluation Office thus found that collaboration with the Commission subjected 
the institution’s technical judgment to political interference.163 The role of the ECB as part of 
the Troika also is controversial.164 Links between the Irish Central Bank and ECB (with 
national Central Bank governors being ECB members) raised possible conflicts as these 
actors effectively sat on ‘both sides of the table’, alongside both national authorities and 
international lenders.165 The European Parliament also identified conflicts arising from the 
role of the ECB in the Troika as both ‘technical advisor’ and creditor.166  
Irrespective of these divisions and conflicting interests, theory suggests that if policy 
is made by international organisations such as the Troika, outcomes might again favour 
financial interests. Moving decision making to the realm of ‘international financial 
diplomacy’, away from domestic elected bodies, shifts distributional conflict further from 
popular control. 167 Transnational policymaking also raises costs of mobilisation for interest 
groups, limiting influence to only the better resourced groups.168  
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Policy Salience, Crisis and Personal Insolvency Law’s Arrival on the Policy 
Agenda  
 
‘Acute awareness of households’ financial stress’  
 
Recent post-crisis literature has questioned classic collective action theory positions 
emphasising financial sector influence, however.169 The influence of business holds certain 
fragility ‘because [it is] a function of public inattention’. 170 Crisis or scandal can delegitimise 
concentrated interests’ expertise,  and bring sudden salience to previously ‘quiet’ areas, 
making policymakers more responsive to public opinion and diffuse interests such as 
consumers. The influence of concentrated interests may be limited by a ‘need to justify their 
preferred policy in terms of a narrative that link[s] their specific preferences to the 
interests of a diffuse group’,171 or to the health of the wider economy.172  
The raising of political stakes in the distributional fall-out of the Irish crisis 
transformed personal insolvency law from a politically ignored area into one of high 
salience (see Figure 3).173 The sheer number of households in debt difficulty created a 
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considerable political demand for debt relief.174 Typical difficulties in mobilising consumers 
(especially debtors175) existed in the crisis’ early years,176 but proved less problematic over 
time as new groups formed to advance debtor interests.177 The ‘loud’ politics of salient 
issues thus created conditions where wider public or consumer interests might win out 
over the interests of the narrow few.178  
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Figure 3: The increasing salience of issues relating to household debt is reflected in mentions of related terms in 
Irish newspapers. Source: Nexis search of leading Irish newspapers based on circulation numbers and subject-
matter (Sunday Independent, Irish Independent, Irish Times, Irish Daily Mail, Evening Herald and Metro 
Herald, Irish Daily Mirror, Sunday Business Post, Irish Examiner, Sunday Mirror, and Sunday Tribune).  
 
The initial addition of personal insolvency law to the policy agenda, after years of 
policymakers ignoring this issue, suggests such success for diffuse interest groups, and 
political responsiveness to popular demand for household debt relief. The recently elected 
Irish government launched the initial draft legislation in 2012 as a ‘crucial promise’ to 
voters, which would assist ‘those in unexpected difficulties as a result of the current 
fiscal, economic and employment conditions.’179 The government proclaimed itself ‘acutely 
aware of the financial stress that households are facing’, and ‘committed to assisting those 
who cannot pay’ by rebalancing ‘the rights of the borrower and lender in a fairer manner.’180 
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This commitment to enact consumer bankruptcy legislation, ‘introducing effective relief 
where none had existed before’,181 might initially seem like a rare victory for ‘Main Street’ 
over ‘Wall Street’.182 
 
From policy recognition to legislative detail 
 
The content of Draft 1, however, shows that any declaration of an unlikely defeat for 
concentrated financial sector interests was premature. While the draft legislation followed 
the structure proposed by the LRC, its details contained significant differences, generally 
leaning towards a debt collection paradigm (Table 2). The draft introduced more onerous 
access conditions for what was to become the DRN procedure, while extending the duration 
of debtor repayments and adding debtor sanctions in the bankruptcy procedure. In respect 
of the DSA procedure, and the new government-designed PIA procedure, the draft featured 
more onerous access conditions, raised the level of creditor approval required for an 
arrangement to become effective, weakened property exemptions, extended the duration of 
the repayment period prior to debtor discharge, and added controls on debtor behaviour.  
This might be explained by the fact that in an environment of widespread default , 
debtors become a large enough constituency to require recognition on policy agendas but 
may remain insufficiently organised to shape legislative detail.183 Even this agenda setting 
ability may not have been solely within the power of debtor interest groups and voters, 
however. The Irish Banking Federation (IBF) had not opposed reforms, and instead limited 
                                                          
181
 Kilborn, ‘Reflections’ n 53 above, 338.  
182
 Levitin n 36 above, 1994. 
183
 Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 'Resolving Debt Overhang' n 22 above; Kastner n 11 above. 
 41 
 
its public statements to framing discussions regarding the shape of legislation. It argued 
primarily for a model of consensual restructuring, rather than mandatory imposition of 
debt relief.184 Similarly, the government announced its proposals as fulfilling the state’s 
obligation under its Troika agreements, showing that popular support alone did not force 
this legislation onto the agenda.185 A further complication is that while debtors represent a 
large electoral constituency, they remain a minority population, capable of being outvoted 
by a wider public hostile to overly generous debt relief laws. This point is discussed further 
below.  
 
 
 
 
Loud Politics, a Public Stage and Political Responsiveness to Popular 
Demand  
 
The next stage of the legislative process involved a public consultation period, as well as 
parliamentary committee scrutiny of Draft 1.186 Following public hearings, the committee 
published an evaluation report and proposed amendments oriented towards the provision 
of more extensive debt relief (Table 3). Most notably, the committee departed significantly 
                                                          
184
 Spooner n 54 above, 278-280. 
185
 Department of Justice and Equality n 179 above. 
186
 See Houses of the Oireachtas n 177 above. 
 42 
 
from the draft’s ‘market-based debt resolution’ model, 187 in proposing a ‘cram-down’ 
mechanism in the DSA and PIA procedures. This would have removed creditors’ ‘veto’ 
power and allowed an independent adjudicatory body to impose arrangements on 
dissenting creditors. The committee further recommended that access to the procedures 
should be better facilitated, and that income repayment periods should be reduced to three 
years, from Draft 1’s position of six (DSA) and seven (PIA).  
These debtor-friendly developments may result from the salience and visibility of 
the public parliamentary committee process,188 and the procedural design which facilitated 
pluralistic interest group participation.189 These are conditions of ‘loud politics’, which 
favour public opinion and diffuse interests, in contrast with the usual dominance of 
concentrated interests in times of ‘quiet politics’.190 The committee received and published 
stakeholder submissions and held open hearings in which consumer/debtor organisations 
were well represented. Actors such as the Free Legal Advice Centres (FLAC) brought 
considerable expert knowledge to these public hearings.191 This reduced politicians’ 
reliance on banking interests for information, while the proceedings’ salience offered 
potential rewards of voter approval for politicians who invested in understanding the 
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evidence. Based on similar analysis and coding to that carried out above in relation to draft 
legislation, stakeholder submissions show consumer and practitioner groups proposing 
specific recommendations directing the legislation closer to a debt relief paradigm (Table 
7). Submissions urged the introduction of more lenient access, income repayment and debt 
discharge conditions.192 All submissions also focused on the increasingly contentious issue 
of the creditors’ ‘veto’ in respect of the DSA/PIA procedures. Consumers and practitioners 
called for the imposition of outcomes on recalcitrant creditors.  The IBF contrastingly 
supported the consensual restructuring model, claiming it would produce better results for 
debtors and creditors than statutorily-mandated outcomes in bankruptcy. Consistent with 
literature suggesting financial sector interests prefer to influence policy privately,193 the IBF 
confined its argument narrowly and appealed to general economic and moral principles 
rather than specific legislative details.  
 
A Return to Quiet Politics: Technical Complexity, Opaque Fora and Potential 
Creditor Influence 
 
Gains for diffuse interests and the debt relief paradigm were effaced, however, on 
publication of the Personal Insolvency Bill 2012 two months later. As Table 4 illustrates, the 
Bill failed to adopt the parliamentary committee proposals, and its amendments involved 
significant moves closer to the debt collection perspective than even the original draft. 
Access conditions for the DRN, DSA and bankruptcy procedures were tightened, including 
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increased court oversight of debtor entry to the DRN and DSA procedures. Debtor property 
exemptions under the DSA procedure were weakened, and under all procedures the 
category of debts excluded from discharge was expanded to include tax debts. Further 
behavioural obligations were imposed on debtors in all procedures. It was at this stage that 
the DRN procedure was transformed from a one-year ‘no income, no assets’ procedure, to a 
three-year procedure with repayment to creditors from increased debtor income or assets.  
This trend may relate to the ‘quiet politics’ of the Bill’s drafting in the opaque forum 
of government departments, without further public consultation or hearings. Public 
visibility was further reduced by the technical nature of this drafting process. 194 The Bill’s 
provisions were more complex than the framework legislative ‘Heads’ of Draft 1, or the 
high-level recommendations of the parliamentary committee. Under the ‘issue attention 
cycle’, it is difficult to keep questions salient for long periods, particularly where legislation 
is complex and citizens may be unable to ascertain whether details advance their 
interests.195 This opens space for creditor groups (who have resources to disseminate 
technical analysis in short timeframes), as well as practitioners and government officials, to 
influence legislation.196 In a jurisdiction previously lacking a consumer insolvency law and 
so practitioners, judges and researchers in this field, politicians may find it hard to 
challenge ‘expertise’ drawn solely from banking sector opinion.197 Industry representatives 
constrained in the public forum of a highly salient parliamentary hearing might thus find 
opportunities for private influence in the technical process of drafting detailed 
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provisions.198 When faced with allegations of financial sector influence on presenting the 
Bill to parliament, the government pointed to the consultation process and public hearings 
on the Draft Scheme (despite the government’s Bill ultimately ignoring the debtor friendly 
recommendations arising from this process).199 This approach seems consistent with 
accounts of ‘strategic shirking’. Politicians could pursue positions fitting their policy 
preferences, and potentially those of influential interest groups, in the ‘quiet’ legislative 
stages, while maintaining an image of wider participation in the ultimately inconsequential 
‘louder’ stages.  
Governing politicians’ actions were of course constrained by Ireland’s commitments 
under its financial assistance programme. The extent of these limitations is evident in the 
Memoranda of Understanding signed between Ireland and the Troika, and the quarterly 
European Commission and IMF reviews of Ireland’s performance of its commitments – 
documents described as complex and ‘barely analysed sources’.200 This study’s analysis 
isolated personal insolvency recommendations in these sources and matched these to the 
eleven categories of legislative provisions identified above. 201  It then coded each 
recommendation as leaning towards ‘debt collection’ or ‘debt relief’ paradigms (or as 
‘neutral’). The results show that Troika positions largely directed the draft legislation 
towards a debt collection paradigm (Table 6). To confirm this trend, a content analysis of 
IMF and European Commission reports shows that these documents mention themes 
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associated with the debt collection paradigm more frequently than references to debt relief 
(Table 1 and Figure 4).202  
 
Table 1: Themes associated with ‘Debt Collection’ and ‘Debt Collection’ paradigms, neutral themes in IMF and European 
Commission quarterly reviews 
Debt Collection Themes Debt Relief Themes Neutral Themes 
Promotion of bank lending  Restructuring unsustainable debts 
(fresh start) 
Overall efficiency of new 
system  
Personal insolvency as means of 
regulating problems of excessive 
non-performing loans on bank 
balance sheets 
Debt overhang rationale (debt 
relief to remove lags on aggregate 
demand) 
‘Balance’ between debtors 
and creditors, between 
competing aims  
Concerns re debtor 
‘engagement’/cooperation 
Concerns re debtor access costs Court capacity 
Need for increased repossessions 
(foreclosures) 
Saving homes  
Need for debtor discipline 
(moral hazard concerns) 
Reduction of waiting period for 
bankruptcy discharge 
 
Consensual renegotiation 
promoted over mandatory debt 
write-downs 
  
Protecting State as creditor    
Concerns re debtor friendly 
public opinion 
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Protection of creditor rights   
  
 
 
Figure 4: Themes mentioned in IMF, European Commission report discussions of Personal Insolvency 
Legislation. Sources: European Commission Economic Adjustment Programme Reviews, Summer 2011-
Autumn 2014; IMF Staff Article IV Report (2010), IMF Reviews under the Extended Arrangement (Ireland), 1
st
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The European Commission warned that any personal insolvency legislation could endanger 
Ireland’s overall economic adjustment programme, 203  and so ‘should be carefully 
formulated in order to prevent an adverse impact on borrower behaviour and unintended 
consequences for the profitability of Irish banks’.204 Similarly, the European Central Bank 
considered that new measures ‘should not result in blanket mortgage debt forgiveness and 
should be geared to minimising the risk of abuse’ and avoiding ‘negative implications for 
credit institutions... [and] the financial system’.205 The Commission supported the current 
Bill as being ‘broadly in line with programme understanding’, 206 now that ‘earlier concerns 
with the protections of creditors’ rights [had] been addressed through strengthened appeal 
provisions and greater involvement of the courts...’207 The Commission also approved of 
additional access conditions for entering the DRN and PIA procedures, and supported 
provisions excluding tax debts from discharge, on the grounds that this ‘protects fiscal 
resources’.208  
Theoretical understandings of how international organisation policymaking favours 
concentrated interests may explain the pro-creditor veering of the Troika 
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recommendations.209 The IMF emphasises the importance of ‘national ownership’ of 
programmes, requiring domestic authorities to assume political responsibility for 
policies.210 The Fund thus aims to win public support and in Ireland ‘engage[d] in extensive 
outreach activities vis-à-vis the media and other stakeholders’. 211  The European 
Commission was less inclined to participate in such activities,212 while stakeholders (such 
as trade unions) and observers criticised the ECB as ‘hawkish’ and unmoved by democratic 
and distributive considerations.213 In a context of reduced influence of diffuse groups in 
Commission and ECB decision-making, it is significant that the IMF was ‘overruled by the 
European partners’ in relation to important aspects of Ireland’s programme.214  The 
mandates of these actors, and the financial assistance programmes’ emphasis on restoring 
‘banking stability’ and ‘financial market confidence’, mean that their technical 
understandings of ‘good public policy’ might align with financial sector interests.215 
Inevitably these organisations worked closely with the financial sector, and relied on it for 
information of market conditions. For example, IMF and Commission documents cite banks’ 
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reports of uncooperative defaulting borrowers,216 and deteriorating ‘mortgage payment 
discipline’.217 
Managing ‘Rising Political Pressure’ in the Final Legislative Passage  
 
The Bill remained to be debated in the Irish Parliament before enactment, potentially 
opening another opportunity for influence of popular opinion and a plurality of 
stakeholders. Troika documents show acute awareness of this possibility, frequently citing 
challenges to policy proposals posed by ‘political constraints’, 218  ‘rising political 
pressure’,219 and increasing ‘calls… for some form of debt forgiveness for stretched 
mortgage borrowers’.220 The European Commission cautioned against the Bill’s technocratic 
consensus being undermined by popular demand for more extensive debt relief during the 
parliamentary process: 
The authorities took great care to ensure that adequate safeguards were included in 
the draft legislation to avoid any possible negative repercussions on overall payment 
discipline. It will be important to ensure that these safeguards are maintained as the 
bill progresses through Parliament.221  
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Despite many politicians’ statements expressing demand for debt relief among financially 
troubled constituents, 222 the government ensured the 2012 Act was enacted in a near 
identical format to the Bill it had designed with Troika approval (Table 5). Again, the 
technical nature of the detailed legislation may have limited voters’ ability to monitor and 
influence amendments. 223 Technicality’s challenge to political responsiveness is illustrated 
by opposition politicians’ necessary limiting of focus to key salient features of the Bill – 
primarily the issue of the creditors’ ‘veto’ - rather than attempting to claw back all the pro-
creditor ground made by previous drafts. The government defended this point legalistically, 
citing advice cautioning that a ‘cram-down’ mechanism would breach creditors’ 
constitutional rights. 224 This approach of clouding a contested issue with depoliticising 
technicality could be interpreted as ‘strategic shirking’, facilitating the government’s pursuit 
of preferred policy. Even without such devices, the discipline of the Irish parliament’s 
Westminster-style system means that government legislation is usually comfortably 
passed.225 Individual politicians are neither as accountable nor responsible outside of 
election season as legislators in countries such as the United States.226 A proposed 
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opposition amendment that would have weakened the creditor veto was thus out-voted 
easily.227  
Alternatively, the Irish government may have calculated that the majority of - 
personally unaffected, intermittently observant - voters might have lacked enthusiasm for 
monitoring legislative details so as to ensure debt relief is offered to the large minority at 
the expense of repaying borrowers and taxpayers.228 The Government cited this idea of 
fairness as between debtors to the Troika as a political concern influencing policy.229 It 
argued in parliament that measures such as mortgage debt ‘cram-down’ would jeopardise 
the supply of credit and reduce access for ‘financially viable’ borrowers.230 Here lines blur, 
however, between political arguments responding to perceived public opinion, and efforts 
of politicians and interest groups to shape public opinion to advance their prior positions.231 
This argument exemplifies Trumbull’s insight that an interest group may win influence by 
presenting a powerful legitimating narrative of market access which draws diffuse interests 
(non-defaulting consumer borrowers; taxpayers; homeowners concerned about falling 
asset values232) together in support of an industry-friendly position.233 The message of the 
disastrous consequences of restricting creditors’ rights is a well-worn ‘winning strategy’ for 
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gaining legitimacy and political support for policies favourable to financial interests. 234 Such 
narratives may be particularly powerful in the Irish context of a bailed out and nationalised 
banking sector,  in which taxpayers fund creditor losses. Just as opposition to rescuing 
perceived irresponsible households militated against US bankruptcy reform, 235  Irish 
politicians cited concerns of their constituents regarding ‘why they should bail people out 
when [the constituents] did not go mad and spend big during the boom.’236 The ‘self-
evident’ logic that ‘one has to pay one’s debts’ is also powerful,237 and can convince publics 
to acquiesce to policies (such as austerity) that harm many.238  The political majority in 
Ireland may have been content with responding to the household debt crisis by ‘legislating 
around the edges, softening the impact, eliminating obvious abuses’, 239 without embracing 
an idea of widespread debt relief. While debtor imprisonment and mass home 
repossessions were politically unacceptable,240 the popular conscience may have been 
soothed at avoiding these salient and egregious outcomes. It may not have enquired as to 
how legislative detail impacted society’s weaker members,241 even if these also represent 
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those with the highest marginal propensity to consume, on whom society’s economic 
growth depends.242 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The European Commission’s review of Ireland’s economic adjustment programme 
described the country’s new personal insolvency law as ‘based on a broad political 
consensus, which balanced the interests of debtors and creditors.’243 Such description 
conceals the political contestation involved in the development of the legislation and hides 
how a balance between debtors and creditors can be tilted by legislative detail to produce 
losers and winners. This article has sought to correct this record by illustrating how 
recognised pro-creditor legislation emerged through ‘quiet politics’ of bureaucratic and 
technocratic decision-making in opaque fora, despite opposing positions advanced through 
popular opinion and diffuse interests in ‘louder’ public fora. As comparative consumer 
bankruptcy literature would predict, and technical and political accounts subsequently 
admitted, the undue pro-creditor leaning of the legislation contributed to its inefficacy.  
Key post-2012 pro-debtor reforms undertaken by the Irish Government in response 
are consistent with the trend identified in this paper. Most notably these amendments 
included the reduction of the waiting period for the debtor’s bankruptcy discharge,244 and 
the introduction of a limited ‘cram-down’ mechanism for mortgage debt.245 The timing of 
these amendments is relevant: they came soon after Ireland’s Troika commitments had 
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ended and the IMF and Commission had both acknowledged the failures of the 2012 Act.246 
Both reforms also arrived in the period preceding a general election, when politicians have 
little time to shape public opinion and respond most readily to the public’s heightened 
scrutiny of their actions.247 These reforms confined themselves to salient issues, rather than 
undoing the pro-creditor gains represented in the detailed provisions of the legislation. The 
reform process also evidences a degree of ‘strategic shirking’. Though undoubtedly 
benefitting affected debtors, the reduction in the waiting period for bankruptcy discharge 
ultimately may not be of great economic significance. Instead it may merely expedite the 
accrual of inevitable costs to creditors. This highly visible reform was championed by a 
‘policy entrepreneur’,248 drawn from the junior party of the Irish coalition government, 
which was predicted (correctly) to suffer heavy electoral losses.249 It was designated for 
public consultation and parliamentary hearings, but these were narrowly confined to ‘one 
very specific matter’ of reducing the bankruptcy term from three years to one, with other 
aspects of personal insolvency law shielded tightly from discussion.250 The public process 
produced the simple and popular recommendation of reducing the period, which was 
promptly enacted. In contrast, the issue of mortgage cram-down – of tremendous economic 
significance and direct consequence to creditors – was addressed in the opaque forum of 
government departments. This process produced a limited and technically complicated 
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reform, which places tight constraints on judicial power to impose mortgage debt 
forgiveness on recalcitrant creditors.251 While popular opinion and diffuse interests may 
have pushed the removal of the ‘creditor veto’ onto the policy agenda, the detailed reforms 
may not deliver debt relief to the extent expected.  
This study acknowledges the need to distinguish causation from association in 
analyses of corporate power.252 Outcomes favourable to financial sector interests might not 
necessarily result from business lobbying or ‘insider’ policymaking. Further studies might 
explore the extent to which such outcomes result from prevailing ideas.253 These might 
range from technical analyses viewing personal insolvency law as less a matter of saving 
homes and more of saving bank balance sheets from losses on ‘non-performing loans’ 
(NPLs), 254 to political ideology adopting a ‘quasi-theological view of debt’.255 While the 
technical case for household debt relief becomes increasingly accepted, its obstacles include 
not only political constraints, but also continued technical disagreement between, as well as 
within, international policymaking organisations.256 This may contribute, for example, to 
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the contrast between the pro-creditor advice of the IMF and Commission teams on Ireland’s 
personal insolvency reform, and the conflicting emphasis on debt relief visible in policy and 
staff documents of these institutions.257 While this article shows the role of the Troika to 
have been undoubtedly influential,258 Irish domestic politicians had also embraced neo-
liberal austerity policies even before entering into commitments with these international 
organisations.259 As noted above, the Irish experience finds parallels in other countries 
following the crisis, but it may not speak for all cases at all times. The story of pre-crisis US 
bankruptcy reform, for example, is one of pro-debtor legislation being introduced through 
‘quiet’ politics which deliberately avoided controversy and ‘drew little attention’, while pro-
creditor amendments were pushed through during an ‘enormously controversial’ ‘fierce 
struggle’.260 
Despite these caveats, this study argues that traditional accounts of collective action 
theory appear to hold firm under conditions of post-crisis, recession politics. Though the 
crisis brought into focus issues of financial regulation and household debt, the power of 
popular opinion and diffuse interest groups remains insufficient to avoid policy outcomes 
more favourable to concentrated interest groups. Policymaking in ‘quiet’ bureaucratic and 
technocratic fora produces these effects particularly. The consequences are stark. Over one 
quarter of Irish residential mortgages remain in arrears or in largely unforgiving 
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restructuring arrangements,261 and household debt levels rank high even among the 
elevated standards of contemporary European economies.262 It has long been recognised 
that a heavily indebted society is an unequal one,263 while it is now increasingly accepted 
that a society that unduly pushes risks onto its debtors will not fulfil its economic potential. 
This study argues that policymaking in contemporary democratic capitalism may struggle 
to address these effects, and instead inequality of market outcomes may be replicated in 
‘differential access to political power.’264 Financial institutions’ political and economic 
significance may equip them not just with a veto power over insolvency arrangements 
under ‘market-based debt resolution’ laws, but also with a veto over the content of such 
laws themselves. Insolvency legislation itself risks becoming a ‘creditors’ bargain’,265 as 
debtors are excluded from political negotiation and contestation. During the long legislative 
process, one Irish politician noted that  
‘telling constituents that legislation to assist is coming has been frustrating. One 
constituent replied, “So is Christmas”. People are frustrated and it is imperative that 
the Bill not frustrate and alienate them further.’266  
The negative consequences of such alienation in household debt policymaking, if not 
avoided, are likely to extend to significant and ongoing economic, social, and political risks. 
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INSERT APPENDIX TABLES HERE 
The Quiet-Loud-Quiet Politics of Post-Crisis Consumer 
Bankruptcy Law: the case of Ireland and the Troika 
Appendix 
 
Tables showing trends of amendments in the draft legislation. 
Key:  
White = category of provisions not considered in this draft of the legislation 
Blue = Pro-creditor/Debt collection group of amendments: position adopted in relation to this category is closer to a Debt Collection/Creditor Wealth 
Maximisation paradigm than the position adopted in the previous draft legislation/proposal.   
Red = Pro-debtor/debt relief group of amendments: position adopted in relation to this category is closer to a Debt Relief/Debtor Friendly paradigm 
than the position adopted in the previous legislation/proposal. 
Grey = Unchanged: category considered in this draft, but position unchanged from previous draft of legislation 
 
 
 
  
Table 1 Tracking trends of draft legislation amendments: Draft General Scheme of Personal Insolvency Bill 
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Table 2: Tracking trends of draft legislation amendments: Parliamentary Joint Committee Report 
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Table 3: Tracking trends of draft legislation amendments: Bill as introduced to Parliament 
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Table 4: Tracking trends of draft legislation amendments: Personal Insolvency Act 2012 as enacted 
Personal Insolvency Act 2012 as Enacted (including relevant secondary legislation): Comparison with Bill as introduced to Oireachtas (Parliament) 
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Table 6: Positions adopted by European Commission and IMF relating to personal insolvency legislation in quarterly reports on Ireland's 
financial assistance programme. 
Troika Positions (combined positions relating to all procedures)   
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Table 7: Positions adopted by interest groups in response to Draft General Scheme of Personal Insolvency Bill 
Positions adopted by interest groups in response to Draft General Scheme of Personal Insolvency Bill (see Key in Figure 6 below) 
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Figure 6: Participants at discussion of Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality on the Personal Insolvency Bill, 15 
February 2012 
 
